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Wiretapping and Eavesdropping:
A Review of the Current Law
By FRANcis C. SuLuvAN*
O VER the years since its invention, the telephone has passed
through the stages of being a luxury and convenience until today it is
generally considered a necessity for both business and home. At the
present time, there are more than eighty-eight million telephones in
use in the United States.' Recent estimates place the number of tele-
phone conversations in the United States at one-hundred fourteen
billion per year2 and the number per person at 591 per year.3
This wide usage of the telephone provides the background for the
problem of wiretapping, which, as used here, refers to the surreptitious
overhearing of telephone conversations by mechanical or electronic
means.4 The problem of the legality of eavesdropping and the use of
evidence procured through wiretapping has been before the courts
for almost forty years, and barring some dramatic change of circum-
stances seems certain to be a matter for judicial concern for at least the
next forty years.
It is well to remember that we are dealing here with a basic tool
of criminal investigation.5 This simple fact is sometimes overlooked in
the heat and passion surrounding partisan discussion of this subject,
*Professor of Law, Loyola University of Chicago; Visiting Professor of Law,
Louisiana State University (1966-67).
3Ama ucAN TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH Co., TE Wonri's TErxHoNEs 2 (1966).
2Id. at 11.
3Ibid. For a discussion of the relation of these statistics to the problem of wire-
tapping and eavesdropping see Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional
Rights of the Committee on the judiciary of the United States Senate Pursuant to S.
Res. 234, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., on Wiretapping, Eavesdropping, and the Bill of Rights,
Pt. 1 (1958).
4 See generally DAsH, ScawARTz & KNOWLTON, THE EAVESDROPPERS (1959); New
York State Legislature, REPORT oF T JOINT LEGisLATVE ComisrTrr ON PRVACY OF
CoMmuICATioNs AND LICENsuR OF PRIVATE INVESTIGATORS (1962); CAL. SENATE Com-
MIrrEE ON JuDiCLARy, REPORT ON THE INTERCEMTON OF MESSAGE RY T= USE OF ELEC-
TaoNic AND OTma DEmCEs (1957).
5 This article is limited to a consideration of wiretapping and eavesdropping by law
enforcement officers. For one consideration of the use of wiretapping and eavesdropping
by private investigators see Lipset, The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Problem: A Private
Investigator's View, 44 MnqN. L. REV. 873 (1960). For examples of other uses of wire-
tapping and eavesdropping see Ruebhausen & Brim, Privacy and Behavioral Research,
65 CoLum. L. [1Ev. 1184, 1190-91 (1965).
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resulting in strong preconceptions and even stronger blanket con-
demnations. Reduced to its most basic form, wiretapping is nothing
more than a specialized type of surveillance, a method of investigation
as old as the organized detection of crime.
Wiretapping came into widespread use as an investigative tool in
order to combat the use of the telephone by the criminal element in
society as an efficient scientific aid to the planning, preparation, and
commission of crime. Since the telephone provides an immediate,
direct, and private means of communication, freely available to
criminals, some specialized method of surveillance was sought by law
enforcement agencies to counteract the effects of the perversion of
the telephone to criminal use.
It must be conceded by all that wiretapping is a most useful device
for the detection of crime and the production of evidence of crime.'
It has the great benefit of almost complete secrecy, while providing
the ability to monitor and record verbatim telephone conversations at
substantial distances. The cost of wiretapping operations is small in
terms of both manpower and equipment, and, when compared to the
information potentially obtainable, this cost becomes minute. It must
likewise be conceded that wiretapping by its very nature constitutes
an invasion of the privacy of telephonic communications, and provides
a ready potential for abuse.7 The basic difficulty with wiretapping is
that it is indiscriminate-it subjects to official scrutiny all conversa-
tions, innocent as well as criminal, conducted by all persons using the
tapped line. The balancing and weighing of these competing interests
has proved to be a difficult task for the courts.
Background: Development of the Law
Wiretapping was first brought before the Supreme Court of the
United States in 1928. The decision in Olmstead v. United States8 has
remained the basic law in this area for almost forty years, despite the
vigorous and classic dissents by Justices Holmes,9 Brandeis, Stone and
6 See Rogers, The Case for Wire Tapping, 63 YALE L.J. 792 (1954); Silver, The
Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Problem: A Prosecutor's View, 44 MwN. L. REv. 835, 844
(1960).
7See AmmcA Csvm L nTiES UNiON, THE WrE PiNG PRoBLEM TODAY
(March 1962. Revised April 1965).
8277 U.S. 438 (1928).
9 Mr. Justice Holmes dissented on non-constitutional grounds, saying: "I think it a
less evil that some criminals should escape than that the Government should play an
ignoble part." Id. at 470. The much quoted phrase "dirty business" was used by Holmes
to refer to wiretapping in violation of the Washington state statute, not to wiretapping
in general. Ibid.
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Butler.10 The majority in this five to four decision laid down the rule
that evidence obtained by federal officers through tapping telephone
wires, even though in violation of a state statute, may be used in a
criminal prosecution in the federal courts. Clearly the most significant
holding by the Court was that wiretapping does not constitute an un-
reasonable search and seizure in violation of the fourth amendment,
because it does not involve a "physical invasion of the premises."11
Most of the law subsequently developed in this area is based upon this
refusal to apply constitutional restrictions to the wiretapping method
of producing evidence.
The Federal Communications Act: Section 605
In the course of the decision, the majority invited Congress to
enact legislation to exclude wiretap evidence,-a result which the Court
thought could not be achieved merely by judicial interpretation of the
The late W. H. Parker, former Chief of Police in Los Angeles, in describing police
work in general, observed: "It is often a dirty business-a very dirty business-because
of the warped nature of the criminals with whom the police must often deal. But history
has shown and is continuing to show that it is a necessary business, and that the re-
sponsibility must be placed on someone." Parker, Surveillance by Wiretap or Dictograph:
Threat or Protection?, 42 CALF. L. IEnv. 727, 728 (1954).
lo justices Brandeis, Stone and Butler dissented on constitutional grounds. Mr.
Justice Brandeis introduced the concept of a right to privacy which should be protected
not by the fourth amendment, but by the due process clause contained in the fifth and
fourteenth amendments. He described the right to privacy as "the right to be let alone
-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men." 277
U.S. at 478. It is interesting to note that these dissents have been cited and quoted much
more than the majority opinion, almost to the point of submerging the legal rationale of
the decision in the sea of eloquence produced by the dissenters.
11 The majority reasoned that the prohibition of the fourth amendment extends
only to searches of a man's person, his house, his property and his effects, and that
tapping a telephone wire does not involve any of these. The fourth amendment provides:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affinnation, and particularly de-
scribing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST.
amend. IV.
The Court also found no violation of the fifth amendment, there being "no evidence
of compulsion to induce the defendants to talk over their many telephones," and since
the defendants were "voluntarily transacting business without knowledge of the inter-
ception." 277 U.S. at 462. One is led to wonder whether this interpretation of the fifth
amendment retains any validity in the light of recent decisions of the Supreme Court.
In this connection, consider the following statement of the Court in Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966): "Today, then, there can be no doubt that the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege is available outside of criminal court proceedings and serves to protect
persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed from being compelled
to incriminate themselves." Note, however, that Miranda still speaks of some degree of
compulsion before the fifth amendment privilege is violated.
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fourth amendment. It was indicated that legislation could be enacted
to protect the secrecy of telephone messages by providing for the
exclusion of intercepted messages from evidence in criminal trials. Sub-
sequently in 1934, Congress enacted the Federal Communications Act
and in the now famous section 60512 provided that "no person not
being authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and
divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect,
or meaning of such intercepted communication to any person .... "
Many commentators have attacked the notion that section 605 was
in fact the response of Congress to the invitation of the Supreme Court
in Olmstead.13 It appears that the Act was passed with little debate or
consideration of this section, and the clear purpose of the Act seems
to be simply to create the Federal Communications Commission as a
new governmental agency with powers to regulate the communications
industry. The origin of section 605 is apparently to be found in section
27 of the Radio Act of 1927,'" which may well have found its way into
the 1934 Act merely by way of re-enactment. There seems to be no
support for the view that Congress intended section 605 to operate as
a ban on the use of wiretapping as a means of producing evidence for
use in criminal trials.
The thirty-one words quoted above have, however, been lifted
from their context in a statute containing some 20,000 words15 and used
to control the use of evidence obtained through wiretapping. 6 This
approach was first used by the Supreme Court in 1937 in the first
Nardone case.lr Here it was held that section 605 applies to federal law
enforcement officers as well as to any other person, and that the pro-
hibition of "divulgence" forbids divulgence by use of the intercepted
communication in evidence in a federal criminal trial. The Court,
giving the statute a most literal interpretation, stated:
the plain words of § 605 forbid anyone, unless authorized by the
sender, to intercept a telephone message, and direct in equally clear
12 48 Stat. 1064 (1934).
13 See Rosenzweiz, The Law of Wire Tapping, 32 CoRmMr L.Q. 514, 534 (1947);
Westin, The Wire-Tapping Problem: An Analysis and a Legislative Proposal, 52 COL 'U
L. REv. 165, 174 (1952).
1444 Stat. 1162 (1927).
15 Anthony P. Savarese, Jr., Chairman of the New York State Legislative Joint Com-
mittee on Privacy of Communications, has described section 605 as "a brief, obscure, and
undebated clause in that Act-truly a needle in a legislative haystack." Savarese. Eaves-
dropping and the Law, 46 A.B.A.J. 263, 336 (1960).
16 At least one federal court summarily rejected the application of section 605 to
wiretapping in the period shortly after the passage of the Federal Communications Act.
Smith v. United States, 91 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1937).
17 Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [VOL 18
WIRETAPPING AND EAVESDROPPING
language that "no person" shall divulge or publish the message or its
substance to "any person." To recite the contents of the message in
testimony before a court is to divulge the message.' 8
As a result, the exclusionary rule, sought to be established by the
Olmstead minority, was created by statutory interpretation of section
605 and applied to the federal courts, despite the fact that the Act
itself contained no such exclusionary provision. 9 This decision dealt a
double blow to the hopes of prosecutors and law enforcement officers.
It had been contended that the Act did not by its terms apply to law
enforcement officers and that they should, therefore, be excluded from
its provisions entirely.20 In addition, it had been argued that testimony
in open court consisting of evidence of criminal conduct could not
have been contemplated by Congress or such intent would have been
spelled out clearly in the statute. It seems apparent that the philosophy
of the Olmstead minority found a receptive audience in the Nardone
court to the extent that the new stabtory interpretation reached the
result desired.21
Two years later, the second Nardone case22 provided the Supreme
Court with a vehicle to extend the newly created exclusionary rule to
the "fruit of the poisonous tree."23 Consequently, not only the com-
munication intercepted by a wiretap, but also any evidence obtained
as a result of information produced through the wiretap, must also be
excluded from evidence in the federal courts.24 This decision strikes
directly at the great value of wiretaps as a means of producing leads
for further investigative development.25 If the source of the evidence
181d. at 382.
19 The Act provides a penalty of imprisonment for not more than one year (two
years for subsequent convictions), and a fine not exceeding $10,000, or both, for "Any
person who wilfully and knowingly does or causes or suffers to be done any act, matter,
or thing, in this chapter prohibited or declared to be unlawful .... 47 U.S.C. 501. The
frequent use of the exclusionary rule as a means of enforcement of constitutional pro-
visions and statutes seems to indicate a feeling on the part of the Supreme Court that
criminal penalties are ineffective to accomplish the purpose for which they were created.
This is a serious denigration of the criminal law.
20 302 U.S. at 383-84.
2 1 Mr. Justice Roberts described wiretapping as "inconsistent with ethical standards
and destructive of personal liberty." Id. at 383.22 Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
23 This famous phrase was first used by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in this case.
24The Court thus made the wiretapping exclusionary rule co-extensive with the
rule as applied in the search and seizure cases. See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United
States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
25 It may be assumed, however, that law enforcement agencies continue to use
wiretapping for this purpose. If the existence of a wiretap is never disclosed, the true
source of any evidence so obtained will be unknown to the defense.
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is tainted by the metliod of its production-wiretapping-then the
evidence is inadmissible in a federal criminal trial.2
The next step was taken by the Supreme Court in the Weiss case,'
where the application of section 605 was extended to intrastate com-
munications making evidence of such communications obtained
through wiretapping inadmissible in the federal courts. 8 This result
closed an apparent gap in the law which would have allowed ,iretap-
ping and use of both a communication and its fruits where only a local
conversation was involved.
The question of the defendant's standing to object to the introduc-
tion of evidence produced by wiretapping reached the Court in 1942.
In the Goldstein case 9 the Supreme Court held that the protection
provided by section 605 is personal to the participants in a telephone
conversation, and only the participants in the intercepted conversa-
tion may object to its use in evidence. This principle has never been
overruled and is presumably controlling today in the wiretapping
area,30 despite the fact that a different rule has been adopted in the
search and seizure cases. 1 If the goal is to prohibit the use of all wire-
tap evidence through strict application of section 605, then there ap-
pears to be little justification for this arbitrary limitation. Any use of
an intercepted communication would seem to constitute a "divul-
gence" under the interpretation of Nardone 132 calling for the applica-
tion of the exclusionary rule therein created.
On the same day, the Supreme Court held in the Goldman case83
that the use of an electronic eavesdropping device,34 without a trespass,
whereby one side of a telephone conversation is overhead, does not
26 For an excellent discussion of this rule see Bernstein, The Fruit of the Poisonous
Tree, 37 ILr. L. B v. 99 (1942).27 Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939).
28 In this case the Government tapped a wire without the consent of either party.
The recordings of the conversation were then used to force one of the parties to the
conversation to consent to the divulgence of the contents of the intercepted message.
The Court held such consent to be invalid under section 605. Id. at 329.
29 Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114 (1942).
30 See United States v. Gris, 247 F.2d 860 (2d Cir. 1957); Manger v. State, 214
Md. 71, 133 "A.2d 78 (1957).
31 See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960). The reliance in the Goldstein
case on the then existing law in the search and seizure cases, which has since been
changed, makes it possible to draw a contrary conclusion, but so long as wiretapping
cases are determined on a non-constitutional basis, cases based upon the fourth amend-
ment are not necessarily controlling.
32 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
33 Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
34 The device used was a "detectaphone."
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violate either the fourth amendment or section 605r This result rep-
resents an attempt to confine the application of section 605 to the
typical wiretap situation where the interception is of both sides of the
communication and is obtained by overhearing the conversation as it
is transmitted through the telephone system. In the Goldman situation,
all conversation taking place within the room could be heard through
the electronic device. The fact that a portion of the conversation over-
heard happened to consist of one side of the telephone conversation
was merely incidental. This is more properly an example of electronic
eavesdropping which is considered hereafter.
The Consent Doctrine
With the increasing use of the telephone and the introduction of
the telephone extension, it was only natural that cases would arise in
which one party to a telephone conversation, without the knowledge
of the other party, authorizes a third person to listen to the conversa-
tion by means of a telephone extension. Such a case was presented to
the Supreme Court in Rathbun v. United States.5 6 In a rather sur-
prising departure from the philosophy of prior decisions, the Court
held that section 605 forbids only those interceptions not authorized
by the sender, and, therefore, when one party consents to allow a third
person to overhear a telephone conversation, there is no "interception"
under section 605, both caller and intended receiver being considered
as "senders" under the Act.37 This decision, of course, opens the door
for one very common and important investigative technique whereby
an informer makes a telephone call to a suspect and "consents" to
police monitoring of the conversation, resulting in the production of
85 The Court also held that the term interception "does not ordinarily connote the
obtaining of what is to be sent before, or at the moment, it leaves the possession of the
proposed sender, or after, or at the moment, it comes into the possession of the intended
receiver," but rather refers to "the taking or seizure by the way or before arrival at the
designated place." 316 U.S. at 134. For a complete discussion of the various interpre-
tations of the term "interception," as used in section 605, see Bradley & Hogan, Wire-
tapping: From Nardone to Benanti and Rathbun, 46 GEO. L.J. 418 (1958). The problem
of the meaning of the term "interception" has become secondary to the question of
consent in later cases. Bradley & Hogan, supra at 434-41.
36 355 U.S. 107 (1957).
37 The Court interjected somewhat of an assumption of risk theory: 'Each party to
a telephone conversation takes the risk that the other party may have an extension tele-
phone and may allow another to overhear the conversation." Id. at 111.
38 See Wilson v. United States, 316 F.2d 212 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 960 (1964); United States v. Williams, 311 F.2d 721 (7th Cir. 1963). The Wilson
case has achieved quite a degree of independent fame due to its characterization by
the author of the opinion, Judge Carter, as "a small horse soon curried." 316 F.2d at
213.
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incriminating statements.88 Since the Rathbun case, the federal courts
have expanded the consent doctrine so that it is now immaterial
whether the conversation is recorded rather than overhead directly,
or that the extension is installed for the specific purpose of overhearing
the conversation,39 rather than being a regularly installed extension
as in Rathbun.
Free and Voluntary
Perhaps the major problem facing the courts in cases involving
consent is to determine whether the consent given by the participant
in the telephone conversation is actually a free and voluntary consent.
This problem is built into the typical investigative use of the doctrine
where an informer is the consenting participant in the conversation.40
It has been held that an authorization to monitor a conversation is not
involuntary if given in hope of leniency.41 In so holding, the following
standard was used:
The Court would restrain the use of police coercion and of promises
of leniency; and we would restrain the arm of the law from extending
out into the community in search of the weak and the vulnerable who
might be persuaded to authorize official monitoring of their telephone
lines. We believe that the same strict standards which are requiied
in order to validate a consent to a search and seizure should apply to
a consent to intercept a telephone conversation.2
The situation in which an undercover agent or voluntary informant
allows the monitoring or recording of his telephone conversations
presents few problems. This is routine and merely a method of pre-
serving accurately the terms of the conversation to which the agent
or informant could freely testify in court.43 The problem of the volun-
tary nature of the consent arises primarily from the prevalent police
practice of using informers as decoys after their arrest.44 The pressures
exerted upon such a person are obvious, and this tends to throw
doubt upon the voluntary nature of the consent in such cases. It ap-
39 Wilson v. United States, supra note 38; Ferguson v. United States, 307 F.2d 787
(10th Cir. 1962).40 This practice has become standard procedure in narcotics investigations.
41 United States v. Zarkin, 250 F. Supp. 728 (D.D.C. 1966).
42 Id. at 737.
43 Recordings are frequently used to refresh the recollection of a participant in a
conversation prior to trial. See Monroe v. United States, 234 F.2d 49, 57 (D.C. Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 873 (1956).
14 See McClure v. United States, 332 F.2d 19 (9th Cir. 1965); United States ex
rel. Dixon v. Pate, 330 F.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1964).
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pears certain that this problem will receive additional attention from
the courts in the future.
The Pen Register
In many investigative situations it is not enough to overhear a
particular telephone conversation. This is particularly true where the
identity and location of the other party to the conversation are un-
known. To provide at least a part of this information, law enforcement
officers have made use of a device known as the pen register. This
device has no capability for overhearing or reproducing a telephone
conversation, but does record on paper dashes equal to the telephone
number dialed on a telephone line to which the device has been con-
nected.45 With the telephone number available for each call made
from a particular telephone, the law enforcement agency has a ready
made list of the locations called,4 which is a long step toward
identification of the associates of the caller. At least one federal court4 T
has held that the use of the pen register, without the consent of the
subscriber, is a violation of section 605 inasmuch as the existence of a
communication is thereby divulged. This holding appears to represent
an unduly strict interpretation of section 605 by apparently ignoring the
fact that the pen register has no relationship to a communication sent
over the telephone lines, and, as a matter of fact, does not indicate
whether or not a call is ever completed. It is doubtful that a com-
munication exists until a conversation begins between the parties, and
on this basis there should be no violation of the provisions of section
605.48
As a part of the ordinary accounting practice of telephone com-
panies, a record is maintained of the date, numbers called, and duration
45 Devices are also available to provide numbers called from the new push button
phones.
46 This result is accomplished simply by referring to a "reverse listing" directory
in which the listings are by number rather than by subscriber. Such directories are
readily available in most areas.
47 United States v. Guglielmo, 245 F. Supp. 534 (N.D. IIl. 1965). In this case the
pen register was installed by the telephone company at the request of internal revenue
agents. The court summarily disposed of the government's contention that the defen-
dant had consented to such action by the telephone company by requesting the in-
stallation of telephone service, saying: "Recording calls by use of the pen register is
only an occasional service of Illinois Bell Telephone Company and not a practice gen-
erally known to and accepted by its subscribers or published in its tariffs." Id. at 536.
48People v. Schneider, 45 Misc. 2d 680, 257 N.Y.S.2d 876 (Sup. Ct. 1965), held
that the use of a pen register did not violate either defendant's right of privacy or sec-
tion 605 of the Federal Communications Act. Cf. Schmulder v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 116
N.E.2d 819. (Ohio Com. Pl. 1953).
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of all long distance calls made from each telephone. It has been held
that section 605 does not apply to telephone company accounting em-
ployees, and therefore such employees may disclose the existence of
telephone listings, including private listings, and accounting records
giving the above information.49 With reference to long distance calls,
therefore, all of the information which might be obtained through the
use of a pen register, and more, is readily available and admissible in
evidence if otherwise qualified.
The "Beep" Tone Signal
Americans today, particularly in the business community, have
become familiar with a "beep" tone signal on telephone lines indicating
that the conversation is being recorded. This signal is not required
either by statute or by regulation of the Federal Communications
Commission, but is merely a prerequisite to approval of telephone
tariffs governing the use of automatic recording devices maintained by
the telephone company.0 The one decisionr1 considering this matter
indicates that the failure to provide this tone signal will not preclude
the introduction of evidence obtained by recording a conversation
with the consent of one party.
Interception without Divulgence
There remains one major unanswered question in the wiretapping
area. Section 605 prohibits the interception and disclosure of the con-
tents of any communication by wire, but does the Act prohibit inter-
ception alone without divulgence? The Supreme Court has specifically
left this question open.5 2 The Department of Justice has for many years
taken the position that section 605 does not prohibit wiretapping as
such, but only the disclosure or use for personal benefit of information
so obtained.53 As a result of this interpretation wiretapping has been
49 E.g., United States v. Russo, 250 F. Supp. 55, 59 (E.D. Pa. 1966); United States
v. Gallo, 123 F.2d 229, 231. (2d Cir. 1941).
50 The final order of the Federal Communications Commission of November 26,
1947 (as amended May 20, 1948), 12 F.C.C. 1005-09, permits the use of recording
devices in connection with foreign and interstate telephone service, when maintained
by the telephone company, upon the condition that the "use is accompanied by ade-
quate notice to all parties to the telephone conversation that the conversation is being
recorded .. . by the use of an automatic warning device, which will automatically
produce a distinct signal that is repeated at regular intervals during the course of the
telephone conservation when the recording device is in use."
51 United States v. Zarkin, 250 F. Supp. 728, 738 (D.D.C. 1966) (by implication).
52 Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96, 100 n.5 (1957); Rathbun v. United
States, 355 U.S. 107, 108 n.3 (1957).
53 Except for a brief period in 1940, this has been the consistent position of the
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and is conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and pre-
sumably by other federal law enforcement agencies as well,5 but only
with the personal authorization of the Attorney General. The Depart-
ment has also taken the position that internal disclosure within the
Department of Justice does not constitute a divulgence within the
meaning of section 605.'5 Although the information obtained by wire-
taps without the consent of one party may not be used as evidence, the
wiretap is relied upon in certain cases50 as an important investigative
weapon providing important leads for further development by cus-
tomary investigative methods.
This, of course, raises once again the prohibition against the use
of the fruits of wiretapping established in the second Nardone" case.
If it can be established that evidence constituting fruits of illegal wire-
tapping is being offered by the prosecution, Nardone II applies and
the evidence should be suppressed. The difficulty lies in establishing
wiretapping as the origin of the evidence. Nardone II recognized this
problem and established a procedure which hopefully would allow a
defendant to raise this question. The basic requirement is that the
defendant establish in the first instance to the satisfaction of the trial
judge that wiretapping was in fact used by the investigative authori-
ties in his case.58 This fact should be established by filing a motion to
suppress the particular evidence complained of prior to trial. Unless
Department of Justice. See Katzenbach, An Approach to the Problems of Wiretapping,
32 F.R.D. 107 (1963). Some ease support for this view is found in United States v.
Coplon, 91 F. Supp. 867, 871 (D.D.C. 1950), rev'd on other grounds, 191 F.2d 749
(D.C. Cir. 1951): "The congressional act [section 605] as construed by the Supreme
Court does not make wire-tapping an offense, but the interception and disclosure of
the contents of the message constitute the crime. Both acts are essential to complete
the offense."
54 It has been suggested that the Treasurfy Department may hold a different view,
however. See Donnelly, Comments and Caveats on the Wire Tapping Controversy, 63
YALE LJ. 799, 802 (1954).
55 See Katzenbach, supra note 50; Rogers, The Case for Wire Tapping, 63 YALE
L.J. 792 (1954); Brownell, The Public Security and Wire Tapping, 39 Cosmou L.Q.
195 (1954).
56 According to the Attorney General, the Federal Bureau of Investigation is au-
thorized to tap wires only in cases involving national security or human life. Katzenbach,
supra note 50, at 108.
57308 U.S. 338 (1939).58 
"The burden is, of course, on the accused in the first instance to prove to the
trial court's satisfaction that wire-tapping was unlawfully employed. Once that is estab-
lished . . . the trial judge must give opportunity, however closely confined, to the
accused to prove that a substantial portion of the case against him was a fruit of the
poisonous tree. This leaves ample opportunity to the Government to convince the trial
court that its proof had an independent origin." Nardone v. United States, supra note
57, at 341.
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the defendant has had no earlier opportunity in the particular situation
to make such a motion, no such motion to suppress should be allowed
during trial. At the hearing on the motion, if the defendant is success-
ful in establishing that a wiretap was used, and this must be shown
by specific facts,59 then the burden is upon the prosecution to show
that the evidence in question has an origin independent from the wire-
tap.6 In the usual situation, this burden requires the prosecution to
disclose the nature of its case, and thus presents the defense with a
most valuable discovery device quite apart from the decision on the
motion.
It is doubtful whether this procedure is generally effective to dis-
close the use of wiretap information or its fruits. In the usual case, the
defense is working in the dark. There may be a strong suspicion that
wiretapping was employed in the preparation of the particular case,
but this is not sufficient. If the wiretap was installed and operated with
the care generally used in such cases, it should remain undetected. If
care is exercised in the use of the information obtained, it may not be
at all apparent that a wiretap set in motion the events leading to the
prosecution of the defendant. If the law enforcement agency involved
is careful to conceal the fact that a wiretap was employed, this in-
formation may never come to the attention of the defense. Perhaps
this is unavoidable, but so long as the prohibition on the use of non-
consensual wiretap information and its fruits exists, it seems only
proper that defendant should be permitted to discover this fact. Since
the prosecution should not be using this type of evidence as the law
presently stands, should not the defense be allowed to satisfy its
burden by requiring the prosecution to respond under oath to an inter-
rogatory requesting whether a wiretap was employed in the investiga-
tion of the case?
The Law in Federal Courts
Despite the qualms expressed by both commentators and courts
as to the propriety and wisdom of the use of wiretapping as an inves-
tigative tool, the law in the federal courts is quite clear. Wiretapping
unaccompanied by a "physical invasion of the premises" does not
violate the fourth amendment.61 Wiretapping without the consent of
one of the parties to a telephone conversation does violate section 605
59 See United States v. Frankfeld, 100 F. Supp. 934 (D. Md. 1951). Such hearings
are generally referred to as "Nardone hearings."
60 See United States v. Costello, 171 F. Supp. 10 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
61 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928).
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of the Federal Communications Act,"2 and evidence of the conversa-
tion, as well as any evidence constituting fruits of the conversation,
may not be admitted in a criminal trial in the federal courts.63 Only
a party to a tapped conversation may object to the introduction of
evidence obtained through wiretapping.6 4 The consent to monitor or
record a telephone conversation which will permit the use of such
information in evidence must be given freely and voluntarily. 5 If the
defendant in a federal criminal case is to raise the question of the use
of evidence obtained through illegal wiretapping, he must file a motion
to suppress such evidence and establish that a wiretap was employed
in the investigation of his case. If he succeeds in establishing this
point, then the prosecution must proceed to show that the evidence
complained of had an origin independent of the wiretap,66 or all such
evidence must be suppressed.
The Law in State Courts
The situation becomes much more complicated when the state law
concerning wiretapping is under consideration. The reason for this is,
of course, the interaction of section 605 of the Federal Communications
Act with particular state laws.
As early as 1952, the Supreme Court was faced with the problem
of whether or not the exclusionary rule created in the federal courts
for violation of section 605 should be extended to the state courts. In
Schwartz v. Texas67 the Court concluded that section 605 does not
contain "a clear manifestation" of the intention of Congress to render
inadmissible in state courts evidence obtained by wiretapping. This is
hardly surprising in light of the fact that no such "clear manifestation"
appears in the Act with reference to the federal courts, but neverthe-
less the Court reaffirmed the application of the exclusionary rule in
the federal courts. While some authorities believe that Mapp v. Ohio6"
has destroyed the vitality of the Schwartz ruling,69 there is no such case
62 Rathbun v. United States, 355 U.S. 107 (1957); Nardone v. United States, 302
U.S. 379 (1937).
63 Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939); Nardone v. United States, 302
U.S. 379 (1937).64 Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114 (1942).
65 See Blanchard v. United States, 360 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1966); United States v.
Ballou, 348 F.2d 467 (2d Cir. 1965); United States v. Kountis, 350 F.2d 869 (7th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 980 (1966).66 Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
67 344 U.S. 199 (1952).
68367 U.S. 643 (1961) (excluding evidence in state courts where obtained in
violation of fourth amendment).69 See, e.g., Allen, The Excluionary Rule in the American Law of Search and
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authority up to the present time." In order to justify extending the
exclusionary rule to the states under the rationale of Mapp, it would
be necessary to establish wiretapping as a constitutional violation, a
proposition specifically rejected in the Olmstead case and subsequent
rulings. Consequently, it is unlikely that the Court would indirectly
accomplish this result.
Subsequent developments in the law relating to the use of wire-
tapping evidence in state courts have been primarily concerned with
the effect of state statutes permitting wiretapping. In general, state
statutes concerning wiretapping may be divided into two categories:
those permitting wiretapping with or without official authorization,r 71
and those flatly prohibiting wiretapping by all persons, including law
enforcement officers. 72
The New York Practice
New York is the most well known of the states permitting wiretap-
ping, and here the authority is granted not only by statute,7 3 but also
by specific constitutional provision. 4 Under the New York procedure,
law enforcement officers may obtain a wiretap order from a judicial
officer by presenting affidavits or sworn testimony which will satisfy
the judge that there is reasonable ground to believe that evidence of
crime may be obtained through the tapping of described telephone
lines. In a recent decision,h the New York Court of Appeals has held
that supporting testimony under oath is not required if the affidavits
filed are sufficient to satisfy the judge of the existence of probable
cause; but if the affidavit is insufficient for this purpose, additional
Seizure, 52 J. Crm. L., C. & P.S. 246, 254 (1961): "the holding in Schwartz v. Texas,
which permitted the states to admit wiretap evidence in state proceedings, was based
in significant part on the analogous authority of Wolf v. Colorado (338 U.S. 25 (1949)).
That authority has now been overturned."
70In Williams v. Ball, 294 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1961), Judge Friendly said: "We do
not read Mapp v. Ohio, 1961, 367 U.S. 643, as overruling sub silentio Schwartz v.
State of Texas-on which six Justices had expressly relied, only four months earlier, in
the per curiam affirmance .. . of our decision in Pugach v. Dollinger, 2 Cir. 1960, 277
F.2d 739.... We find no basis in Mapp for extending its application to a state's re-
ceiving evidence the divulgence of which would violate a Federal statute." Id. at 96.
71Approximately twenty-six states are in this category. See Criminal Law Com-
ment, Wiretapping: The State Law, 51 J. Crum. L., C. & P.S. 534, 538 n.26 (1961), for
a listing of these states.
72 Approximately nine states are in this category. See Criminal Law Conment,
supra note 71, at 538 n.23.
73 N.Y. CoDE CIm. lhoc. § 813a.
74 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12.
76People v. McCall, 17 N.Y.2d 152, 216 N.E.2d 570, 269 N.Y.S.2d 396 (1966).
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examination must be made of the affiant under oath, and when prob-
able cause is doubtful or indefinite from the affidavits, additional
examination should be made. In other words, substantially the same
safeguards are attached to the issuance of a wiretap order as are
required for the issuance of a search warrant.
Since there is no exception in section 605 permitting wiretapping
by state officers, even under the terms of a court order, every time a
state officer acting under the terms of a wiretap order makes a tap and
testifies in a state criminal trial as to the information thus obtained, he
is violating federal law. This is the problem which has bedeviled the
courts, both state and federal, and there appears to be no satisfactory
solution in view. In its first consideration of this situation, the Supreme
Court held76 that evidence obtained by state officers acting under a
state wiretap order is inadmissbile in a federal criminal trial, the evi-
dence being obtained in violation of section 605.
Since wiretapping by state law enforcement officers, even under
the terms of a valid state court order, was held to be a violation of
federal law, defendants desperately sought a method to prevent the
use of evidence so obtained in state criminal trials. Faced with the
refusal of the Supreme Court in the Schwartz case7 7 to create an
exclusionary rule applicable to the states, defense attorneys attempted
to block the introduction in state criminal trials of evidence which had
been obtained by a violation of federal law by use of the injunction
device in federal court. Once again the Supreme Court was asked to
consider the problem, but the result was merely a per curiam decision,78
the effect of which was to hold that a defendant may not obtain a
federal injunction against a prosecutor proceeding in a state case in
which wiretap evidence might be used.79 As a result, a defendant has
no remedy against the use in a state court of evidence obtained through
the use of state authorized wiretapping, despite the fact that the action
of the state officers constitutes a violation of section 605.
Faced with this closed door, the next effort was to attempt to
induce the New York courts to create an exclusionary rule which
would prevent the use of evidence obtained in violation of the federal
76 Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96 (1957).
77 Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952).
7 8 Pugach v. Dollinger, 365 U.S. 458 (1961), afirming 277 F.2d 739 (2d Cir.
1960). The same result was reached in Voci v. Storb, 235 F.2d 48 (3d Cir. 1956). See
Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951), affirming 184 F.2d 575 (3d Cir. 1950).
7 9 Attempts to utilize the declaratory judgment procedure have also failed. Lebo-
wich v. O'Connor, 309 F.2d 111 (2d Cir. 1962); Williams v. Ball, 294 F.2d 94 (2d
Cir. 1961).
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law. In a four to three decision,80 the New York Court of Appeals
refused to do so, despite a strong dissent by Justice Fuld to the effect
that "the imperative of judicial integrity," the purposes of the exclu-
sionary rule, and the necessity to avoid commission of a criminal act
in the courtroom require a revision of'the New York rule. The effect
of these Supreme Court rulings has been felt at the trial court level,
however. As a result of the Benanti case,8' at least two New York
judges81 have refused to issue wiretap orders on the ground that to do
so would make the court a participant in a federal crime. Other than
this, wiretap orders are being issued in New York, and the results
are being admitted into evidence in criminal trials 3 without any prose-
cutions being forthcoming from the federal authorities for violation
of section 605-a distasteful and unhappy situation which could be
corrected by a simple amendment to section 605 excluding acts by
state officers under the terms of a valid state court order."4 The failure
of Congress to act in this matter can only be attributed to an unwilling-
ness to become involved in the controversy surrounding the whole
question of authorized wiretapping.8 5
A warning has been sounded by Judge Medina that the federal
courts may overturn the New York practice on quite a different basis:
While I agree that there seems to be little likelihood that the rule of
Schwartz v. Texas ... will be changed, at least in the foreseeable
future, it may well be that we are here dealing with something more
than a state rule of evidence to the effect that evidence illegally
obtained is admissible if relevant to the case and otherwise unob-
jectionable. The very fact that the State of New York not only has
formulated through its courts a rule of evidence, but has also estab-
lished and maintained, in its Constitution and legislation, a system
80People v. Dinan, 11 N.Y.2d 350, 183 N.E.2d 689, 229 N.Y.S.2d 406 (1962),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 877 (1962).
81 Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96 (1957).
82 See In The Matter of Interception of Telephone Communications, 9 Misc. 2d
121, 170 N.Y.S.2d 84 (Sup. Ct. 1958); Application for Order Permitting Interception
of Telephone Communications, 23 Misc. 2d 543, 198 N.Y.S.2d 572 (Ct. Gen. Sess.
1960).
83 This result is clearly indicated by People v. McCall, 17 N.Y.2d 152, 269 N.Y.S.2d
396, 216 N.E.2d 570 (1966).
84 For a complete discussion of statutory possibilities for the correction of this
problem, see Westin, The Wire-Tapping Problem: An Analysis and a Legislative Pro-
posal, 52 COLUM. L. REv. 165 (1952). Compare Schwartz, On Current Proposals to
Legalize Wire Tapping, 103 U. PA. L. Ilzv. 157 (1954).85 Almost every session of Congress sees the fSling of one or more bills designed to
correct this situation. Extensive hearings have been held, but no concrete action appears
to be forthcoming.
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of wiretapping that is persistently and continuously in operation
through orders of New York judges authorizing the wiretapping and
through New York enforcement officers who do the wiretapping and
then divulge the wiretaps in testimony before Grand Juries and petit
juries, all despite the ruling of the Supreme Court in Benanti... to
the effect that the entire system is illegal and in violation of ...
[section 605], and despite the Supremacy Clause, Article VI, Clause
2, U. S. Constitution, may well constitute an invasion of appellant's
constitutional right to due process under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.8 6
The Practice in Other States
While the Supreme Court has apparently left the states free to
choose whether or not they will adopt an exclusionary rule to apply to
evidence obtained through wiretapping,87 most states have not as yet
considered the problem.88 To avoid the necessity of judicial establish-
ment of an exclusionary rule, some states, such as California,"9 have
adopted the rule by statute. This would seem to be the clearest method
of expressing the policy of a particular state.
Michigan 0 and Pennsylvania9' have held that the receiver of a
telephone message has a right to record the message without notice to
the other party, and that evidence so obtained is admissible in a
criminal trial.
Following the federal cases interpreting section 605, Pennsylvania
has also held that the act of overhearing a telephone conversation with
the consent of one party is not a violation of the Pennsylvania statute
88 Judge Medina concurring in United States v. McMann, 275 F.2d 284, 286 (2d
Cir. 1960). For a view that wiretapping violates the first amendment, see King, Wire
Tapping and Electronic Surveillance: A Neglected Constitutional Consideration, 66
Dicm. L. REv. 17 (1961).8 7 Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952).
88 See Criminal Law Comment, supra note 71, at 540.
89 CAL. PEN. CODE § 653; (d) provides: "Except as proof in a suit or prosecution
for violation of this section, no evidence obtained as a result of eavesdropping upon or
recording a confidential communication in violation of this section shall be admissible
in any judicial, administrative, legislative or other proceeding."
0 People v. Maranian, 359 Mich. 361, 102 N.W.2d 568 (1960).
91 Commonwealth v. Bruno, 203 Pa. Super. 541, 201 A.2d 434 (1964), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 965 (1965). The court found no violation of PA. STAT. AuN. tit. 15, § 2443
(1957), in the recording of a telephone message by the rightful receiver. The statute
provides: "No person shall intercept a communication by telephone or telegraph with-
out the permission of the parties to such communication. No person shall install or
employ any device for overhearing or recording communications passing through a
telephone or telegraph line with intent to intercept a communication in violation of
this act. No person shall divulge or use the contents or purport of a communication
intercepted in violation of this act ... :'
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prohibiting wiretapping. 92 The same result has been reached under
the California statute.93
In gambling cases it is not unusual for police officers engaged in
a lawful search to answer a telephone call made to the premises and
to use the conversation as evidence of the violation of the gambling
laws. This practice is not held to be a violation of either section 605 or
state wiretap statutes on the basis that there is no interception of a
communication, but only proper police action. 94
In general, it can be said that in those states with statutes pro-
hibiting wiretapping, evidence which might be obtained in this man-
ner will be excluded from evidence both on the basis of section 605
of the Federal, Communications Act and the state statute. In those
states not having a statute prohibiting wiretapping, presumably the
exclusionary rule would be applied in reliance on section 605 as
interpreted in the first Nardone case.95 As for those states authorizing
controlled wiretapping, such as New York, absent a reversal of the
Schwartz doctrine, they remain free to admit as evidence in their
criminal trials the information obtained by proper use of their stat-
utes.96
Electronic Eavesdropping
One of the unsuspected but very welcome by-products of World
War II has been the tremendous development in electronic equipment.
This equipment, developed to a great extent for espionage and counter-
espionage use, found a natural post-war use in law enforcement activ-
92 Commonwealth v. Murray, 206 Pa. Super. 298, 213 A.2d 162 (1965). The court
reached this result on the theory that no interception was involved in the overhearing
of a telephone conversation on an extension phone.
93People v. La Peluso, 239 Cal. App. 2d 792, 49 Cal. Rptr. 85 (1966); People v.
Fontaine, 237 Cal. App. 2d 320, 46 Cal. Rptr. 855 (1965). Illinois has recently deter-
mined that the Illinois Eavesdropping Act, IlL. Cmnm. CODE § 14, which applies to
wiretapping, requires the exclusion of evidence obtained through eavesdropping without
the consent of all of the parties. People v. Kurth, 34 Il. 2d 387, 216 N.E.2d 154
(1966).
4 Leogrande v. State Liquor Authority, 25 App. Div. 2d 225, 268 N.Y.S.2d 433
(1966); United States v. Pasha, 332 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
839 (1964).
95 Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937).9 6 It should be noted, however, that three members of the Supreme Court, dissent-
ing in the most recent consideration of the eavesdropping problem, Lopez v. United
'States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963), indicated a readiness to overrule Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), thus making wiretapping a violation of constitutional
rights to privacy created by the interaction of the fourth and fifth amendments. Such a
ruling would require the exclusion of wiretapping evidence in state courts under the
doctrine of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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ity, and has operated as a great stimulus for the development of even
more sophisticated listening devicesaT Today, it is indeed a rare Amer-
ican home that is not equipped with many modern electronic devices
from broilers to television sets. This domestic wonderland is taken
much for granted today, but it is certainly true that the average
American little understands the "how" of his electronic wonders. Per-
haps the general attitude is one of open-mouthed awe at the constant
flow of magic produced by modem science. This awe tends to turn to
fear of the many publicized uses of electronic equipment on the part
of law enforcement agencies 8
The law enforcement use of electronic eavesdropping devices is
merely a part of the constant effort to improve all equipment used for
the prevention and detection of crime 9 The electronic aids are used
primarily as an extension of the senses of sight and hearing making it
possible for an officer to see and hear what would be impossible with
the naked eye and ear. With this improved ability comes, as a matter
of course, better and more efficient law enforcement.
The philosophical question presented, and much debated today,
is whether the undoubted improvement in law enforcement is bought
at too high a price in terms of the resulting loss of individual privacy.
It should be emphasized that no one claims a right to remain free from
police surveillance, including eavesdropping, in order to enable him
safely to commit acts prohibited by society through the criminal laws.
It is equally true that no one desires to impinge on the constitutional
rights of any person, be he saint or sinner. That some difficulty has
arisen in squaring these two truisms can be charged to the absence of
a clear delineation of the nature and extent of the constitutional right
to privacy. The Supreme Court has not as yet undertaken a compre-
9 7 See generally BpxON, Tnn PiuvAcy INVADEBS (1964); DASH, ScHwAR z &
KNOWLLTON, THE EAv DoPPEms (1959).
98 This article is limited to a consideration of the problems created by law enforce-
ment use of electronic and other eavesdropping devices. The general availability of
eavesdropping equipment creates a much more serious problem in the non-official use
of such equipment. For examples of such uses of eavesdropping equipment, see Lipset,
The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Problem: A Private Investigator's View, 44 MEN. L.
REv. 873 (1960); Ruebhausen & Brim, Privacj and Behavioral Research, 65 CoLTJM.
L. REv. 1184, 1191 (1965).
It would seem clear that such non-official use of eavesdropping equipment should
be prohibited and punished. It is only in the law enforcement use of eavesdropping
that a viable justification exists.
99 The many developments in communications and scientific methods of investi-
gation and identification are examples of the vast improvement in law enforcement
equipment, methods, and operations.
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hensive discussion or definition of the right to privacy,100 a right not
spelled out in the Constitution. Nor has Congress chosen to enact
legislation in this area,'0' which would seem to be the best hope for
stability and certainty in the future.
The methods of electronic eavesdropping available for law enforce-
ment use today stagger the imagination, ranging from the rather con-
servative concealed microphones and recorders to the now-famous
"oliv&' capable of broadcasting conversations from the luxurious depths
of a martini. 102 One of the most serious legal questions presented today
is whether the law expounded by the Supreme Court in considering
the use of relatively simple electronic devices is adequate to control
the very sophisticated devices in use today and those on the draw-
ing board for tomorrow. The difficult case-by-case development of the
law in such a fast developing scientific area tends to create a time lag
calling urgently for statutory treatment.
The Goldman-Silverman Rationale
The Supreme Court first really considered the electronic eaves-
dropping situation in the Goldman case,-0 3 holding admissible in evi-
dence in the federal courts evidence pr6duced through the use of an
electronic eavesdropping device'0 " without any physical trespass. In
specifically holding that such means of obtaining evidence does not
violate the fourth amendment, the Court reached a result similar to
100 justice Brandeis, dissenting in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478
(1928), said: "The makers of our Constitution ...conferred, as against the Govern-
ment, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the
Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must
be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment." See the dissent of Mr. Justice Bren-
nan in Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 446 (1963).
In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), a state statute forbidding the
use of contraceptives was held to violate the fourteenth amendment. The Court dis-
cussed the "right of privacy" enjoyed by married couples, and remarked that the first
amendment "has a penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental intrusion."
Id. at 483. The Court also implied that the "right of privacy" is one of those rights re-
tained by the people under the ninth amendment. See generally Beaney, The Con-
stitutional Right to Privacy in the Supreme Court, 1962 Sup. CT. Rlv. 212; Prosser,
Privacy, 48 CAra'. L. REv. 383 (1960).
101 Congress is presently conducting hearings concerning eavesdropping, and has
in the past conducted extensive hearings, but no specific action has been forthcoming.
102 For an excellent recent discussion of the methods and technology of eaves-
dropping, see Westin, Science, Privacy, and Freedom: Issues and Proposals for the
1970's, 66 CoLum. L. Ray. 1003, 1004-10 (1966).
103 Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
104 The device in question was a "detectaphone" listening device installed on the
outer wall of the room.
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that in the wiretrap cases.10 5 While section 605 has been interpreted
as requiring the application of an exclusionary rule in the wiretap
cases,106 the Federal Communications Act has no application to cases
not involving the interception of telephone and telegraph communica-
tions, and no comparable federal statute has been enacted to apply
to eavesdropping cases. 0 7 As a result, the rule of the Goldman case
is the basic law in the electronic eavesdropping cases today.
It was not until the Silverman case,108 almost twenty years later,
that the Supreme Court was presented with the opportunity to examine
and refine the trespass concept which had been carefully excluded in
formulating the rule allowing'the use of evidence obtained by means
of electronic eavesdropping. Here a "spike mike" had been inserted by
government agents into a party wall, making contact with a heating
duct in the adjacent house, turning the entire heating system into a
conductor of sound, and enabling the agents to overhear incriminating
conversations which were then used as evidence. The Court held that
this evidence was gathered in violation of the fourth amendment and
must therefore be excluded from use in a federal criminal trial.10 9 The
decision was based not upon any local rules of trespass to property,
but rather focused upon the "reality of an actual intrusion into a con-
stitutionally protected area."110
Silverman is not at odds with the Goldman rule, but is rather a
delimitation of the scope of that doctrine. Clearly, if the method of
accomplishing electronic eavesdropping is by means of a trespass, the
fourth amendment is violated and the resulting evidence, as well as
any evidence constituting fruits of the illegal conduct, must be ex-
cluded from use in both federal and state criminal trials. The effect of
Silverman is to refine the term "trespass" as used in the Goldman rule
to mean "actual intrusion into a constitutionally protected area." Ab-
sent such an intrusion, evidence procured through electronic eaves-
dropping will be admissible in the federal courts, assuming, of course,
105 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
1o6 Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
107The Federal Communications Commission has recently banned the use of radio
transmitting microphones for eavesdropping purposes without the consent of both parties
to the conversation, but the ban does not apply to "operations of any law enforcement
officers conducted under lawful authority." 31 Fed. Reg. 3400 (March 1966), amending
47 C.F.R. § 15.11 (1966).
108 Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
109 As a result of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), such evidence gathered in
violation of the fourth amendment must likewise be excluded from use in state criminal
trials.
110 Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961).
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that such evidence satisfies the other requirements of the law of evi-
dence.
The "actual intrusion" element of the rule is normally referred to
as physical penetration. Any physical penetration, no matter how small
or insignificant, will constitute a violation of the fourth amendment
resulting in the exclusion of the evidence so obtained. In Silverman,
although the result was great, the actual penetration was slight. In
another "spike mike" case"' the penetration into the wall was no
greater than that made by a thumb tack, but this was sufficient to
constitute a violation of the fourth amendment. Even the lowering of
a microphone down an air shaft opposite a grille in an apartment has
been held to amount to a prohibited physical penetration where the air
shaft was physically located within the area of the apartment.112 Cer-
tainly, if the eavesdropping equipment is installed during the course
of an actual physical unauthorized entry, the result will be exclusion
of any evidence so produced,:"3 but this method of operation appears
to be only a relic of the past. Equipment presently available to law
enforcement officers obviates the necessity of making any such entry
or penetration, and it should be a rare occasion today when such anti-
quated methods are used. This fact seems to leave the rule of the
Silverman case operating in a vacuum. The cases in which the courts
have considered the use of modem electronic devices requiring no
physical penetration have uniformly followed the Goldman rule and
allowed the product of the eavesdropping to be introduced into evi-
dence."14
The "constitutionally protected area" referred to in Silveiman
relates to those areas which have been held in the general search and
seizure cases to be within the protection of the fourth amendment,
such as houses, automobiles, offices, and hotel rooms. Of particular
interest is the apparent exclusion of jails from the protection of the
III Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158 (1964), reversing per curiam 204 Va. 275,
130 S.E.2d 437 (1963).
112 Cullins v. Wainwright, 328 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1964).
'
1 1 In Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954), state officers made an unautho-
rized physical entry into defendant's house and installed a microphone. The evidence
obtained by this "almost incredible" police conduct was used to convict defendant in
the state courts. The Supreme Court held that the police conduct violated the fourth
and fourteenth amendments, but refused to exclude the evidence so obtained under the
rule of Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). Such evidence would be excluded today
under the rule of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), and Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471 (1963). See People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
"14 E.g., People v. Anderson, 145 Cal. App. 2d 201, 302 P.2d 358 (1956) (hearing
aid device); People v. Graft, 144 Cal. App. 2d 199, 300 P.2d 837 (1956) (Fargo
amplifier).
[Vol. 18
WIRETAPPING AND EAVESDROPPING
fourth amendment115 as it has been a traditional technique to wire for
sound both cells and interview rooms.
Concealed Microphones and Recorders
Another phase of the eavesdropping problem, one that is not tech-
nically electronic eavesdropping at all, concerns the use of concealed
microphones and recorders. This situation is most frequently found
where an informer or undercover agent is equipped with electronic
equipment for the purpose of transmitting and/or recording conver-
sations with a suspect. The equipment in use today is easily concealed
and capable of high performance. The benefits to law enforcement
agencies of the use of such equipment are many. In some circumstances
such equipment provides a desirable check on the actual activities of
an informer; in all situations a verbatim record of entire conversations
is possible. It is true that this is clandestine equipment and trickery is
involved in its use. It is equally true that any party to a conversation
may testify to its contents, and the electronic equipment makes avail-
able a more complete and accurate version of the conversation than
would otherwise be possible.
The first of these cases to come before the Supreme Court resulted
in a five to four decision 10 upholding the introduction of evidence
obtained through radio transmission of a conversation. The Court
finding no physical intrusion by the informer equipped with a con-
cealed transmitter found no violation of the fourth amendment. In the
particular case, the informer did not testify himself, but rather a gov-
ernment agent was allowed to testify as to the contents of the conver-
sation as overheard on a radio receiver. Such a case does not represent
the traditional secret listening to a conversation between two unsus-
pecting persons, but involves the active collaboration of one of the
parties to the conversation-the equivalent of the consent to monitor
cases in the wiretapping area." 7 The Court equated this use of elec-
tronic eavesdropping equipment with any other permissible police
stratagem,"" and despite a strong dissent by Mr. Justice Frankfurter,'"
'
15 See Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139 (1962); United States v. Kahn, 251 F.
Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); People v. Morgan, 197 Cal. App. 2d 90, 16 Cal. Rptr. 838
(1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 965 (1962).
116 On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
117 See Rathbun v. United States, 355 U.S. 107 (1957).
18 The Court stated: "We think the administration of justice is better served if
stratagems such as we have here (the use of informers, accessories, accomplices, false
friends, or any of the other betrayals which are 'dirty business') are regarded as raising,
not questions of law, but issues of credibility. We cannot say that testimony such as
this shall, as a matter of law, be refused all hearing." 343 U.S. at 757-58.
119 Mr. Justice Frankfurter believed that sanctioning such "dirty business" "makes
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refused to adopt any "finespun doctrines for exclusion of evidence."' 20
The same type of problem, this time involving a concealed pocket
wire recorder, returned to the Supreme Court in Lopez v. United
States,'2 - the most recent consideration of electronic eavesdropping by
the Court. The majority of the Court followed its prior holding in On
Lee,122 and since the government agent using the device was present
at the conversation with the consent of the defendant, no violation of
the fourth amendment was found and the recording was held to be
admissible in evidence.123 Lopez represents, on its face, simply an
adherence to the On Lee view that if a participant to the conversation
can, and in this case did, testify as to the contents of the conversation,
then it is only reasonable to allow the best possible evidence of the
conversation-the verbatim recording. In all of these cases one person
is placing personal reliance upon one with whom he chooses to discuss
criminal matters. If his choice is unfortunate, this is but a risk one
must take. The Court has never gone so far as to exclude evidence
for lazy and not alert law enforcement. It puts a premium on force and fraud, not on
imagination and enterprise and professional training.... [Tihese short-cuts in the de-
tection and prosecution of crime are as self-defeating as they are immoral. . .. Such
encouragement to lazy, immoral conduct by the police does not bode well for effective
law enforcement. Nor will crime be checked by such means." 343 U.S. at 761-62.
120 Frank, J., dissenting in the Court of Appeals, United States v. On Lee, 193
F.2d 306, 313-14 n.17 (1951), made the following often-quoted analysis of the prob-
lem: "A dictaphone, by its very nature, conducts an exploratory search for evidence of
a houseowner's guilt. Such exploratory searches for evidence are forbidden, with or
without warrant, by the Fourth Amendment.. . .A search warrant must describe the
things to be seized, and those things can be only (1) instrumentalities of the crime or
(b) [sic] contraband. Speech can be neither. A listening to all talk inside a house has
only one purpose-evidence gathering. No valid warrant for such listening or for the
installation of a dictaphone could be issued. Such conduct is lawless, an unconstitu-
tional violation of the owner's privacy."
Brennan, J., dissenting in Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 464 (1963), was
not so certain: "But in any event, it is premature to conclude that no warrant for an
electronic search can possibly be devised. The requirements of the Fourth Amendment
are not inflexible, or obtusely unyielding to the legitimate needs of law enforcement. It
is at least clear that 'the procedure of antecedent justification before a magistrate that
is central to the Fourth Amendment,' Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 272
(separate opinion); see McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455; Abel v. United
States, 362 U.S. 217, 251-52 (dissenting opinion), could be made a precondition of
lawful electronic surveillance."
121373 U.S. 427 (1963).
122343 U.S. 747 (1952).
12 3 As Mr. Justice Harlan put it, "this case involves no 'eavesdropping' whatever
in any proper sense of that term. The government did not use an electronic device to
listen in on conversation it could not otherwise have heard. Instead, the device was
used only to obtain the most reliable evidence possible of a conversation in which the
Government's own agent was a participant and which that agent was fully entitled to
disclose." 373 U.S. at 439.
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obtained by an undercover agent or informer simply because a criminal
was unaware of the true nature of the person with whom he was deal-
ing,'12 and this is about the only basis on which the evidence in On
Lee and Lopez could be excluded.
The Lopez Dissent: A Right to Privacy
The true significance of the Lopez case is to be found in the fact
that it indicates the strong dissatisfaction with the On Lee holding on
the part of four1 24 of the then members of the Court, and further shows
a willingness on the part of three 25 of the then members of the Court
to create a general right of privacy on the basis of the interaction of
the fourth and fifth amendments. Such a right of privacy, as indicated
by the dissenters, would strike at far bigger game than the concealed
radio and recorder cases; it would deal a death blow to all wiretapping
and electronic eavesdropping. The view of the minority appears to
be based upon an overwhelming fear that electronic eavesdropping
will lead inevitably to a police state.126 It is doubtful that most people
would view the discussion of narcotics violations, as in On Lee, or the
offering of a bribe to a government agent, as in Lopez, as privileged
communications protected by a nebulous right to privacy. It is further
doubtful that most people would believe that good government, in the
sense of convicting criminals through the use of the most modem sci-
entific means available, will lead us down the path to tyranny.
It appears certain that future attacks on the existing eavesdropping
rules will follow the lead of the Lopez minority. Efforts will be made
to formulate a right to privacy which would entail the exclusion of
any evidence obtained through the use of electronic devices without
the consent of the person against whom such evidence is offered.
Such is not the rule today, but could well be established by legisla-
tion, or by decision of the Supreme Court based upon the interaction
of the fourth, fifth and sixth amendments.'
123A The Court has recently affimed this position in Hoffa v. United States, 87
S. Ct. 408 (1966), where it stated: "Neither this Court nor any member of it has ever
expressed the view that the Fourth Amendment protects a wrongdoer's misplaced belief
that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it." Id.
at 413.
124 Chief Justice Warren and Justices Brennan, Douglas, and Goldberg.
125 Justices Brennan, Douglas, and Goldberg.
120 'Electronic surveillance, in fact, makes the police omniscient; and police omni-
science is one of the most effective tools of tyranny." 373 U.S. at 466.
127See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S.
478 (1964); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
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The Law in State Courts
On the state level, if evidence is obtained through the use of elec-
tronic eavesdropping devices accompanied by a physical intrusion into
a constitutionally protected area, the evidence is inadmissible in a
state criminal trial.128 In addition, at least seven states presently have
statutes prohibiting the use of electronic eavesdropping techniques
in varying degrees, 129 and these statutes operate within those states as
an extension of the constitutional doctrine. The most comprehensive
of such statutes appears to be that of Illinois,130 which prohibits any
person, including law enforcement officers, from using any device
capable of being used to hear or record oral conversation. The statute
prohibits the hearing or recording of any oral conversation without the
consent of all of the parties thereto,' 1 or the use or divulgence of any
such information, and specifically provides that any evidence obtained
in violation of the statute is inadmissible in any civil or criminal trial.
Despite such statutes, the suspicion persists, supported by some
evidence,13 2 that electronic eavesdropping is still conducted by law
enforcement officers as an aid to investigation of crime. Thus, we find
ourselves in the unhappy situation of seeing our law enforcement
agencies violate the law in a good faith attempt to enforce the law.
No effective sanction for violation of eavesdropping statutes has yet
been developed.1 3 Prosecutions have been few as might be expected.
The prosecutor is in no position to antagonize the police, and indeed
is the beneficiary of such illegal police conduct. The exclusionary rule
which has been created as a control device over improper conduct of
law enforcement officers has yet to prove its value. The chief result
to date appears to be the failure to convict persons who would other-
wise be convicted. If there has been any real effect on police conduct
of criminal investigations, it has not yet become apparent; and so long
128 This result is required by the holding in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
12 9 CAL. PEN. CODE § 653h-j; ILL. Cnvm. CODE § 14-1 to 14-7; MD. ANN. CODE art.
27, § 125A(a) (Supp. 1964); MAss. Gim. LAws ANN. ch. 272, § 99 (Supp. 1964);
NEv. REv. STAT. § 200.650 (1963); N.Y. PEr. LAw § 738; ORE. REV. STAT. § 165.540
(1)(c) (Supp. 1965).
130 1". Cnm. CODE § 14-1 to 14-7.
131 The statute reads "any party," but the Supreme Court of Illinois has recently
held that any party who has not consented to the recording or radio transmission of his
conversation may bar its admission in evidence against him. People v. Kurth, 34 Ill. 2d
387, 216 N.E.2d 154 (1966).
132See BrTON, THE PrIvAcY INVADims (1964); DASh, ScHwARTz & KNowLToN,
THE EAVESDROPPERS (1959).
133 See Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violation of Individual Rights, 39 MMN.
L. REv. 493 (1955); Paulsen, Safeguards in the Law of Search and Seizure, 52 Nw.
U.L. REv. 65, 72-74 (1957).
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as "clearing" crimes remains the standard of police efficiency it is
doubtful whether the failure to convict will have much effect upon
police practices.
Non-Electronic Eavesdropping
Not nearly as dramatic in impact as the electronic methods of
eavesdropping, but equally important, are the common non-electronic
methods in use today. Perhaps the oldest technique of crime investiga-
tion is the surveillance whereby a suspect is placed under observation
and followed secretly wherever he goes. The surveillance may be loose
or tight, for a short period or for extended periods, but in all cases it
represents a form of eavesdropping. To date, there has been no indica-
tion that such methods of investigation violate any constitutional
rights of the person under surveillance, and any evidence so obtained
is admissible in a criminal trial.
It is unfortunate that the most celebrated surveillance case in
modem times failed to reach a decision on the merits."3 4 Such a deci-
sion would have provided answers to the many questions now sur-
rounding the permissible scope and intensity of a surveillance, since
these problems have not as yet received judicial consideration.
The overhearing of a conversation by non-trespassing government
agents without the use of electronic aids has been upheld by the courts
and the evidence so obtained admitted into evidence. 3 5 However, it
would appear that if the eavesdropping is made possible by a trespass,
the fourth amendment will be violated and any evidence so obtained
will be excluded. 3 6 The same rule applies to "visual eavesdropping."137
The propriety of law enforcement officers' use of visual aids has never
been seriously questioned, and normally this use does not constitute
eavesdropping at all.138 The use of infra red lights which allow one
to see in the dark without detection is a cause for some question, as is
the use of concealed closed circuit television; but so far there has been
no consideration of these devices by the courts.
The two-way mirror, although only recently receiving substantial
'34 Giancana v. Johnson, 335 F.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
1001 (1965), decided on the basis of absence of federal jurisdiction. An abbreviated
statement of the facts may be found at 335 F.2d 370 n.1.
135 Anspach v. United States, 305 F.2d 48 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 826 (1962).
'
36 See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
'
3 7 See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948); Brock v. United States,
223 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1955).
138 See On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 754 (1952); United States v. Lee,
274 U.S. 559 (1927); Hodges v. United States, 243 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1957).
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publicity, is not a new device. For many years, for instance, it has been
customary to equip interrogation and polygraph interrogation rooms
with these devices allowing a person on the outside of the room to
view the interior without disclosure. One federal court'" has indicated
approval of the use of evidence obtained by viewing an act of sodomy
in a public washroom through a two-way mirror, but the holding is
restricted to a situation where the view through the mirror is no greater
than that afforded any member of the public entering the washroom.
The two-way mirror has been used primarily in crime prevention
activities as a general surveillanace aid. This type of surveillance
which extends to all members of the general public coming within the
area of view is perhaps the most distasteful type of eavesdropping, and
the courts have so reacted, even though varying results have been
reached.140
Mail Intercept
The security of the United States mail is quite generally accepted
by the public. There are two types of surveillance which may be used
with reference to mail. Mail intercept, which involves the opening of
mail, is prohibited by federal statute, 4' but from time to time some
doubt has arisen as to whether this prohibition has been strictly com-
plied with by law enforcement officers. Mail cover is a form of sur-
veillance consisting of the recording of the information contained on
the outside of first-class envelopes, such as the name and address of
the sender and the addressee and the postmark. In many cases where
the identity or location of a particular person is unknown this informa-
tion obtained through placing a mail cover on known associates of the
person may provide very important investigative leads. This practice,
which leaves the contents of the letter intact and undisclosed, has been
held not to violate any constitutional rights of the person whose mail
is so examined. 42 With new developments allowing the contents of
'13 9 Poore v. Ohio, 243 F. Supp. 777 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
140 See Smayda v. United States, 352 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1965); Britt v. Superior
Court, 58 Cal. 2d 469, 24 Cal. Rptr. 849, 374 P.2d 817 (1962); Bielicki v. Superior
Court, 57 Cal. 2d 602, 21 Cal. Rptr. 552, 371 P.2d 288 (1962); People v. Young,
214 Cal. App. 2d 131, 29 Cal. Rptr. 492 (1963); People v. Norton, 209 Cal. App. 2d
173, 25 Cal. Rptr. 676 (1962).
14139 U.S.C. 4057; POSTAL LAws ANm REGULA-nONS § 113. This prohibition is now
limited to first class mail due to the recent repeal of 18 U.S.C. 1702(c).
142See Canaday v. United States, 354 F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1966); United States v.
Schwartz, 283 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 942 (1961); United
States v. Costello, 255 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 937 (1958).
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a letter to be read without disturbing the apparent integrity of the
envelope, it can be expected that the courts will be called upon to
refine the law as it presently exists.
Conclusion
The law governing eavesdropping has been developed on a hit
and miss basis. It is apparent that a continuation of this approach is
highly undesirable. What is needed is a comprehensive statute de-
signed to apply to all methods of eavesdropping, both electronic and
non-electronic, and applicable to methods in current use as well as
those methods known to be under development. A clear and concise
regulation of these practices, recognizing the right of the citizen to
conduct his everyday affairs in privacy, but making it possible for law
enforcement agencies to compete with the criminal element on equal
terms is long overdue. It is true, and almost all authorities agree, that
there has been a lack of solid factual data upon which to base adequate
legislation. This information, however, may never become available
due to the natural reticence of the people in possession of the actual
facts, and thus it would seem to be a poor excuse for the failure of
Congress to act in this area. It has been suggested by many people that
the best answer might well be the adoption of a statute patterned
after the New York procedure, permitting the issuance of a court
order to law enforcement officers upon the establishment of probable
cause. 43 Such a statute containing clearly defined elements of the
right to privacy and safeguards against abuse would be a welcome
solution to the present confusion and uncertainty.
143 See Westin, The Wire-Tapping Problem: An Analysis and a Legislative Pro-
posal, 52 CoLum. L. REv. 165, 200-08 (1952).
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